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CORE VALUES: FALSE AND TRUE:::
Nathan M. Crystal**
Oscar Wilde, one of history's great wits, defined a cynic as one who
"knows the price of everything and the value of nothing."' The
remark works well as a quip ridiculing those people who devote their
lives to market values and providing rhetorical support for those who
choose artistic paths. As a factual statement, however, Wilde's
definition of a cynic is exactly backwards. Cynicism was a movement
in Greek philosophy that arose in the fifth century, B.C. Its adherents
rejected established social conventions, including wealth, property,
family and religion. Viewing money with disdain, they lived as
ascetics. Because they wore tattered clothes and adopted the tactic of
howling in public at practices they considered to be flawed, they were
often referred to as the "dog philosophers." Contrary to the
impression given by Wilde's quip, the Cynics believed that true
happiness could only be achieved by living a virtuous life, not by
worldly pleasures. To illustrate this point, the story is told that
Diogenes, the most famous of the Cynics, would carry a lit oil lantern
during the daytime, holding it up to people he encountered, to
dramatize his search for a virtuous person.2
Fast forward from Victorian England and ancient Greece to
debates about attorneys' ethics at the end of the twentieth century and
the beginning of the twenty-first century. We hear much talk these
days about the "core values" of the legal profession. Bar leaders
emphasize core values of the profession in their speeches) In a
bruising debate over whether the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct should be amended to allow lawyers to participate in
"Portions of this article were presented at the Indiana University School of Law,
Indianapolis on April 12,2001, as part of its distinguished lecture series. My thanks to
Rory Little at Hastings College of Law for valuable comments on the manuscript.
- Class of 1969 Professor of Professional Responsibility and Contract Law University
of South Carolina School of Law.
1. Oscar Wilde, Lady Windermere's Fan, Act 3, at 45 (Peter Raby ed., 1995)
(1892).
2. See Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, at http'Jlwww.utm.eduiresearch/iep/
c/cynics.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) (defining "Cynics").
3. See, &g., Gary L. Bakke, Will the Real Lawyers Please Stand Up?, Wis. Law.,
May 2001, at 5; Rusty Robnett, Core Values, The Advoc., May 2001. at 4: Molly
Shepherd, Core Values, In My Eyes, Mont. Law., Apr. 2001. at 4; see also Robert
MacCrate, quoted in John Gibeaut, "It's a Done Deal": House of Delegates Vote
Crushes Chances for MDP, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2000, at 92.
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Multidisciplinary Practice, the ABA adopted a resolution relying on
the core values of the profession In another contentious debate over
the ABA Ethics 2000 Commission's proposals to broaden exceptions
to the ethical duty of confidentiality, opponents of change relied on
the core values of the profession.'
The thesis of this article is two-fold. First, like Wilde's quip,
reliance on core values of the legal profession in debates about legal
ethics has rhetorical appeal but is fundamentally misleading. Second,
like Wilde's quip, at a deeper level, reliance on the core values of the
profession often reflects an antimarket, anticompetitive attitude of the
bar that impedes change in rules of professional conduct, including
efforts to improve the delivery of legal services to people of moderate
means.
I. A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF CORE VALUES
Since the ABA adopted the Model Rules in 1983, it has faced
several divisive debates over changes in the rules of professional
conduct. One such debate dealt with Multidisciplinary Practice, or
"MDP." In 1999 and again in 2000, the ABA Commission on
Multidisciplinary Practice recommended that the ABA amend the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct to relax the prohibitions against
sharing legal fees and forming partnerships or other associations with
nonlawyers when one of the activities of the organization is the
practice of law.' At its July 2000 meeting, by a vote of 314 to 106, the
ABA's House of Delegates rejected the Commission's
recommendations and discharged it from further work.'
While the issue of MDP is usually associated with the "big five"
accounting firms seeking to expand the delivery of professional
services to sophisticated clients, the issue is also important for middle-
income clients. Approval of MDPs would open the market to a wide
range of legal services for moderate-income individuals. Lawyers
could form partnerships with social workers, estate planners, financial
consultants, real estate agents, medical providers and other
professionals to offer combinations of services needed by ordinary
consumers.
8
4. See infra note 9 and accompanying text. Robert MacCrate, former President
of the ABA and a leader of the opposition to proposals allowing lawyers to
participate in MDPs, stated, "[t]he action of the House of Delegates sends a clear
message to would-be buyers and sellers [of law practices] that to preserve its core
values, the American legal profession is not for sale." Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 92.
5. Model Rules: ABA Stands Firm on Client Confidentiality, Rejects "Screening"
for Conflicts of Interest, 17 Law. Manual on Prof'l Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 17, at
492 (Aug. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Model Rules: ABA Stands Firm].
6. For the history of these developments, see Center for Professional
Responsibility, at http://wsvw.abanet.org/cpr/home.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2001).
7. See Gibeaut, supra note 3, at 92.
8. Charles W. Wolfram, The ABA and MDPs: Context, History, and Process, 84
[Vol. 70
CORE VALUES
In rejecting MDP proposals the ABA adopted a resolution
sponsored by several state and local bar associations emphasizing the
"core values" of the profession. The resolution read in part:
RESOLVED, that each jurisdiction is urged to revise its law
governing lawyers to implement the following principles and
preserve the core values of the legal profession:
1. It is in the public interest to preserve the core values of the legal
profession, among which are:
a. the lawyer's duty of undivided loyalty to the client;
b. the lawyer's duty competently to exercise independent legal
judgment for the benefit of the client;
c. the lawyer's duty to hold client confidences inviolate;
d. the lawyer's duty to avoid conflicts of interest with the client; and
e. the lawyer's duty to help maintain a single profession of law with
responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal
system, and a public citizen having special responsibility for the
quality of justice.
f. The lawyer's duty to promote access to justice.'
The ABA's reliance on core values of the profession raises an
important issue. How does one evaluate the claim that a proposed
rule violates a core value of the profession? The issue is important
because the term core value indicates a value that is central to what it
means to be a lawyer, and not simply a policy choice between differing
views of professional obligations. If a proposed rule violates a core
value, it follows that the proposal must be rejected because it
threatens a fundamental tenet of the profession.
To decide whether a professional value qualifies as a core value, I
suggest a two-step approach. First, define precisely the value at issue
to eliminate ambiguities and uncertainties about the meaning and
scope of the value. Second, analyze whether the value qualifies for
treatment as a core value. In making this determination, one should
consider both the history and the importance of the value to the
professional role. History of the value is significant because it is to be
expected that core values find expression early in the history of
professional ethics. The importance of the value to the professional
role is significant because a value that has only marginal or uncertain
importance hardly qualifies as a core value.
Minn. L. Rev. 1625, 1648-49 (2000).
9. ABA House of Delegates Resolution adopted July 2000, at
http://www.abanet.orglcpr/mdprecomlOF.html (last visited Sept. 2. 2001) [hereinafter
ABA Core Values Resolution].
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II. UNDIVIDED LOYALTY
"Undivided loyalty to the client" was the first core value the ABA
mentioned in its MDP resolution. The ABA's conception of
undivided loyalty presents definitional, historical and policy
difficulties.
A. The ABA's Concept of Undivided Loyalty is Ambiguous
The following chart summarizes the most important issues
surrounding the scope of a duty of loyalty to a client:
Issues Involved in Determining the Scope of the Duty of Loyalty
1. Causes of Divided Loyalty:
Other clients
Third parties
System of Justice
Lawyer's own interests
2. Organizational Extent:
Personal to lawyer but not imputed to other lawyers in
organization
Imputed to other lawyers in organization:
Firm-wide
Office-wide
Specialization-wide
Screening permitted
Screening prohibited
3. Duration:
Forever
Forever as to specific types of matters
Time limit
Time limit for specific types of matters
4. Subject Matter:
Direct adversity in particular matters
Matter in which client has economic or other interest that could be
affected
Unrelated matters
[Vol. 70
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5. Consentability:
After conflict arises
Prospectively
All clients
Sophisticated clients
With advice of counsel
Take the first issue of the possible causes of divided loyalty. A
number of conflicts could undermine a lawyer's undivided loyalty to a
client, such as obligations to other clients, third parties who are not
clients, the system of justice, or the lawyer's personal or financial
interests. The resolution does not state whether the value of
undivided loyalty encompasses all or only some of these causes. Since
the drafters used the word "undivided" they presumably intended a
broad concept of loyalty. Other sections of the resolution support this
reading. Section l(d) refers to one of these causes: "the lawyer's duty
to avoid conflicts of interest with the client."'" Let us assume, then,
that the drafters intended the expression of the core value of
undivided loyalty to be all encompassing, covering any possible cause.
A requirement that lawyers be free of any obligations except those
to the client is not a core value of the profession because such a
concept is fundamentally inconsistent with a number of well-
established professional obligations. Lawyers are not only
representatives of clients, but they are also "officers of the court""
with legal and professional obligations to the system of justice. 2
Indeed, the Core Values Resolution recognizes that a lawyer is "an
officer of the legal system."' 3 The obligations to the court include the
duty not to present frivolous claims, 4 the duty not to offer perjured
testimony, 5 the duty to disclose adverse legal authority under some
circumstances, 6 and the obligation to refrain from improper
communications with judges, jurors and court officials.' 7 Lawyers owe
certain duties of fairness to opposing parties and their counsel.'"
Lawyers have some obligations to third parties including an obligation
not to engage in misrepresentation' 9 and to respect the legal rights of
10. Id § 1(d).
11. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 Vand. L. Rev. 39
(1989).
12. See Nathan M. Crystal, Limitations on Zealous Representation in an
Adversarial System, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 671 (1997).
13. ABA Core Values Resolution, supra note 9. § 1 (e).
14. Model Rules of Prof'! Conduct R. 3.1 (1996).
15. R. 3.3(a)(4).
16. R. 3.3(a)(3).
17. R. 3.5.
18. R. 3.4.
19. R. 4.1.
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third parties." Although critics of the rules of professional conduct
have complained that these duties to the system of justice and to third
parties should be strengthened,21 such criticism does not refute the
point that these duties do in fact exist.
Not only do lawyers have obligations as officers of the court, it is
also well established that in some situations lawyers may represent
multiple clients. Lawyers may do so with client consent if the interests
are potentially conflicting22 and may even undertake representation of
clients with actually conflicting interests if there is a reasonable
possibility that the lawyer can assist the clients in resolving those
differences and the clients consent after consultation.23 In these cases
the lawyer has loyalty obligations to both clients and is prohibited
from giving undivided loyalty to either.
The advocates of undivided loyalty will likely respond that the duty
of undivided loyalty is, of course, subject to other legal and ethical
obligations. Those limitations are simply implicit within the concept
of undivided loyalty. But this response is insufficient for two reasons.
First, it proves the point that the concept of undivided loyalty suffers
from vagueness and must be more precisely defined. Secondly, it begs
the question of the meaning of undivided loyalty. Although admitting
that the concept of undivided loyalty is subject to legal and ethical
restrictions, it provides no criteria for determining what those
restrictions should be.
B. Imputation of Conflicts of Interest Fails the Criteria for a Core
Value
Consider the second issue dealing with the scope of the duty of
loyalty: organizational extent. One possible meaning of the concept
of undivided loyalty is that the obligation of loyalty is personal to the
attorney who represents the client but does not attach to other
lawyers with whom the lawyer practices. Under this view of loyalty, a
lawyer who is representing a client would violate the principle of
loyalty by undertaking representation of another client against the
first client, but no violation of the duty of undivided loyalty would
result if another member of the firm undertook representation against
the client. The current rules of professional conduct do not accept the
principle of personal loyalty, but rather impute the principle firm-
wide.24 My point is not a statement of what the law of ethics is, but an
analytical point. In deciding what we mean by undivided loyalty, we
20. R. 4.4.
21. See Gaetke, supra note 11.
22. R. 1.7(b).
23. R. 2.2.
24. R. 1.10(a).
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need to understand that the concept could apply personally or
vicariously.
Is firm-wide imputation of conflicts of interest a core value of the
profession? Some commentators certainly think so. Larry Fox, a
member of the Ethics 2000 Commission, and one of the staunchest
defenders of core values has said, "[I]mputation is the foundation
stone of the legal profession's commitment to the core value of loyalty
to clients."'  Others are not so sure. Dean Daniel Fischel of the
University of Chicago Law School has referred to the concept as
obsolete.26
An historical examination of imputation sheds light on whether it
should be classified as a core value. The earliest ABA statement of
rules of professional conduct is the ABA's Canons of Ethics adopted
in 1908. The Canons were amended on a number of occasions until
the Code of Professional Responsibility replaced them in 1969.-
Nothing in the 47 Canons of Ethics refers to imputed or vicarious
disqualification. In particular, the basic canon on conflicts of interest,
Canon 6, makes no mention of the concept.'
A concept of imputation first appeared in the Code of Professional
Responsibility in DR 5-105(D). Interestingly, the Ethical
Considerations of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which were
drafted to reflect the highest standards of the profession, make no
mention of the concept of imputed or vicarious disqualification.
Further, the courts soon recognized a major exception to the
imputation of disqualification under the Code when a lawyer who did
not actually possess confidential information moved between firms. 9
Prior to 1969 a number of court decisions and ethics opinions
recognized the concept of firm-wide disqualification, but these cases
dealt with situations in which the disqualified lawyer possessed
confidential information.3  They could be read to support a broad
principle of imputation, but they could also be read to support a
principle of imputation only when necessary to protect a fundamental
client interest in confidentiality.
Can a concept that made its first appearance in the formal rules of
the profession in 1969, that was ill-defined in the case law, and that
was subject to a major exception truly be viewed as a core value? In
25. Lawrence J. Fox, All's O.K. Benveen Consenting Adults: Enlightened Rule on
Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 701,728 (2001).
26. See Daniel R. Fischel, Multidisciplinary Practice, 55 Bus. Law. 951, 966 (2000).
27. ABA, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics (1967) (containing
annotated 1908 Canons of Ethics) [hereinafter ABA, Opinions].
28. Id at 22.
29. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir.
1975). The holding of Silver Chrysler Plymouth is reflected in Model Rules of Prof'I
Conduct R. 1.9(b).
30. See, e.g., Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. App. 1968)
(discussing authorities).
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fact, the ABA's Core Values Resolution does not mention whether
the duties apply firm-wide or are personal to the lawyer. The
language of the resolution, however, makes it appear that these duties
are personal since the resolution refers to "the lawyer's" various
obligations. If imputation were such an important aspect of loyalty,
the resolution would mention it. In addition, a concept of personal
rather than vicarious loyalty is not far-fetched or outrageous. The
ABA's House of Delegates recently approved the Ethics 2000
Commission's proposed Rule 1.10(a), which recognizes a limited form
of personal, nonvicarious loyalty. The rule states:
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7 or 1.9, unless the prohibition
is based on a personal interest of the prohibited lawyer and does not
present a significant risk of materially limiting the representation of
the client by the remaining lawyers in the firm.
31
Under this rule, when a conflict arises from the personal interest of
the lawyer, rather than because of some client interest, the conflict is
not imputed to the rest of the firm but remains personal to the lawyer.
C. The Prohibition on Screening Does Not Constitute a Core Value
Another important issue dealing with the organizational extent of
the duty of loyalty involves screening. The current rules of
professional ethics prohibit screening of a disqualified lawyer except
when the lawyer moves from service as a government lawyer, judge or
arbitrator to private practice.32  The Ethics 2000 Commission
proposed that when a disqualified lawyer joins a firm, the firm could
avoid imputation of the disqualification by screening the affected
lawyer.33 Two members of the Commission dissented from this
proposal 4  and the House of Delegates rejected the
recommendation.35
31. Ethics 2000 Commission, Proposed R. 1.10(a), at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/
e2k-final rules2.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2001) [hereinafter Ethics 2000 Proposals].
32. Compare Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.10(a) (1996), with R. 1.11 and R.
1.12. See generally Nathan M. Crystal, Professional Responsibility: Problems of
Practice and the Profession 304-05 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter Crystal, Professional
Responsibility] (discussing the scope of the screening rule).
33. ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Proposed Rule 1.10(c) provided as follows:
(c) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, no lawyer associated in
the firm shall knowingly represent a person in a matter in which that lawyer
is disqualified under Rule 1.9 unless:
(1) the personally disqualified lawyer is timely screened from any
participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom;
and
(2) written notice is promptly given to any affected former client to enable it
to ascertain compliance with the provisions of this Rule.
Ethics 2000 Proposals, supra note 31, R. 1.10(c).
34. See ABA Ethics 2000 Comm. on Ethics and Prof'I Responsibility, Minority
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Is a prohibition on screening a core value of the profession? Once
again, we find no mention of the concept of screening in the ABA's
1908 Canons of Ethics, nor can the concept be found in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The mention of screening first appears in
Model Rule 1.11, dealing with former government lawyers, and Model
Rule 1.12, applying to former judges and arbitrators. Interestingly,
these sections allow, rather than prohibit, a firm that hires a former
government lawyer, judge or arbitrator who participated personally
and substantially in a matter to handle that matter, provided the
disqualified lawyer is screened from participation in the matter,
apportioned no part of the fee, and the former agency is notified so
that it can ascertain compliance with the rule.
Even though the current Model Rules prohibit screening of a
disqualified lawyer except when the lawyer moves from service as a
government lawyer, judge or arbitrator to private practice, courts are
divided on the issue of whether screening should be allowed to
prevent disqualification of an entire firm.-' The Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers adopts a qualified view of screening. The
Restatement allows screening when a disqualified lawyer joins a firm
but only when the confidential information held by the personally
disqualified lawyer is "unlikely to be significant in the subsequent
matter. ' 3
7
Once again it is inaccurate to characterize the prohibition on
screening as a core value of the profession. The concept found no
expression in the rules of professional conduct until the Model Rules
were adopted in 1983. Courts and other authorities are divided on
whether and to what extent screening should be allowed.
In summary, claims that various rule changes would violate a core
value of undivided loyalty to clients are very misleading. The
profession does not accept a general value of undivided loyalty to
clients because lawyers owe obligations to the system of justice, to
Report of Commissioner Lawrence J. Fox (joined in as to screening by Commissioner
Susan Martyn), at http:l/www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-dissent.html (last visited Sept. 1.
2001) [hereinafter Fox. Minority Report].
35. See Model Rules: ABA Stands Firm, supra note 5. at 492.
36. Compare Cromley v. Bd. of Educ.. 17 F3d 1059 (7th Cir. 1994) and Manning
v. Waring, Cox, James, Sklar & Allen, 849 F.2d 222 (6th Cir. 1988) (screening
permitted), ivith Roberts v. Hutchins, 572 So. 2d 1231. 1234 n.3 (Ala. 1990) (screening
prohibited). See also Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Ref. Co., 688 N.E.2d 258 (Ohio
1998) (finding that screening is generally available to prevent disqualification of firm
that hires personally disqualified lawyer but that on the facts of the case, the firm
should be disqualified despite screening because of the appearance of impropriety
caused by lawyer abandoning client two weeks after seeking continuance to file
appeal).
37. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Law yers § 124(2)(a) (2000)
[hereinafter Restatement (Third)]. Comment (d) outlines certain factors that can be
used to determine whether the information is significant. Id. The New York Court of
Appeals has adopted the Restatement approach. See Kassis v. Teacher's Ins. &
Annuity Ass'n, 717 N.E.2d 674 (N.Y. 1999).
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third parties and to other clients they represent. Narrower definitions
of the concept of undivided loyalty turn out not to be core values of
the profession because they do not have a firm historical basis and
because they represent policy choices rather than fundamental aspects
of the professional role.
III. STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY
The ABA includes within its list of core values: "the lawyer's duty
to hold client confidences inviolate. '38 For years, the ABA House of
Delegates has battled over the scope of the duty of confidentiality.
The current rule on confidentiality, adopted by the ABA in 1983,
provides only limited exceptions. The term "strict confidentiality"
refers to a duty of confidentiality with few if any exceptions. Without
client consent, express or implied,39 a lawyer may reveal confidential
information only "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act
that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm"4 or to advance a claim or defense by the
lawyer in a matter involving the client.4 Lawyers may not reveal
confidential information either to prevent or rectify criminal or
fraudulent conduct that would damage or has damaged the property
or financial interests of third persons. The rule prohibits lawyers from
revealing confidential information even to prevent a horrible injustice,
such as the execution of an innocent person.42
The Ethics 2000 Commission recommended substantial expansion
of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality. Proposed Rule 1.6
stated:
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation
of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is
reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another and in furtherance of which the
client has used or is using the lawyer's services;
(3) to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial
interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result
or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud in
furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
38. ABA Core Values Resolution, supra note 9, § 1(c).
39. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.6(a) (1996).
40. R. 1.6(b)(1).
41. R. 1.6(b)(2).
42. See Symposium, Executing the Wrong Person: The Professionals' Ethical
Dilemmas, 29 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1543 (1996).
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(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these
Rules;
(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense
to a criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon
conduct in which the client was involved, or to respond to
allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation
of the client; or
(6) to comply with other law or a court order. 3
At its August 2001 meeting the ABA approved the Commission's
proposed exception in section (b)(1), but rejected the proposed
exception in (b)(2) by a vote of 255-151.' The Commission then
withdrew the proposed exceptions dealing with past wrongful conduct
because their defeat appeared clear.4 -  Opponents of the
Commission's proposals argued that the core values of the profession
required a strict duty of confidentiality subject to as limited exceptions
as possible.'
A. Historical Analysis Does Not Support the ABA's Position in
Favor of Strict Confidentiality
Does the ABA's unwillingness to provide broader exceptions to the
duty of confidentiality protect the core values of the profession?
Historically, the ABA's current position does not withstand analysis.
Canon 37 of the ABA's 1908 Canons of Ethics, adopted in 1928, is
enlightening.4 7 It provided that "[tihe announced intention of a client
to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which he is
bound to respect."'  Even more important, Canon 41 provided that
lawyers should disclose fraud or deception that has been practiced on
43. Ethics 2000 Proposals, supra note 31, R. 1.6.
44. See Model Rules: ABA Stands Firm, supra note 5. at 493. In 1991 the ABA
considered a proposal to amend Rule 1.6(b) to allow a lawyer to reveal confidential
information to "rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the
commission of which the lawyer's services had been used." The proposal revived an
issue that had come before the ABA when the Model Rules were originally adopted.
Model Rules of Prof'I Conduct R. 1.6(b) (Proposed Rule 1991). The ABA rejected
the proposed amendment by a vote of 251-158, nearly identical to the 2001 vote. See
ABA Rejects Ancillary Business, Inroads on Client Confidences, 7 Law. Manual on
Prof'l Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 15, at 258-59 (Aug. 28, 1991).
45. Ethics 2000 Commission, at httpJ/wwwv.abanet.orgcpre2k-summary-2001.
html (last visited Sept. 2,2001).
46. See Model Rules: ABA Stands Firin, supra note 5, at 493; see also Fox,
Minority Report, supra note 34, at "Confidentiality" ("To maintain the sanctity of the
lawyer-client relationship, the exceptions to confidentiality crafted into our rules must
be as narrowly drawn as possible.").
47. ABA, Opinions, supra note 27, at 167 (setting forth Canon 37).
48. Id.
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a court or another party. Canon 41 on the Discovery of Imposition
and Deception provides:
When a lawyer discovers that some fraud or deception has been
practiced, which has unjustly imposed upon the court or a party, he
should endeavor to rectify it; at first by advising his client, and if his
client refuses to forego the advantage thus unjustly gained, he
should promptly inform the injured person or his counsel, so that
•49
they may take appropriate steps.
In addition, rules of evidence have long recognized a crime/fraud
exception to the attorney-client evidentiary privilege." Under this
exception if the client consults a lawyer for the purpose of obtaining
assistance in committing a crime or fraud or uses the lawyer's services
to carry out a crime or fraud, any communications with the lawyer
regarding such matter are not privileged. It is difficult to claim that
confidentiality regarding client fraud constitutes a core value when the
law states that such matters are not confidential.
Ethical standards in most states also undermine the ABA's claim
that a strict view of confidentiality is a core value of the profession.
The vast majority of states have adopted confidentiality rules that
authorize disclosure under circumstances not currently allowed by the
ABA rule. Only a handful of states follow the ABA's Model Rule
1.6.52 Forty-two states provide that lawyers have discretion to reveal
confidential information to prevent substantial financial injury
resulting from a client's criminal or fraudulent conduct.53 A number
of states go even further.'
B. Policy Justifications Do Not Justify Strict Confidentiality
The claim that strict confidentiality is a core value of the profession
is not only weak historically, but it rests on tenuous policy
justifications. Advocates of a strict view of confidentiality have made
two arguments in support of their position. One argument rests on
the rights of clients, either legal rights or more broadly defined moral
49. Id. at 181 (setting forth Canon 41). Canon 41 was adopted in 1928.
50. 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2292, at 554 (McNaughton ed., 1961). See generally
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66
Cal. L. Rev. 1061, 1063 (1978) (discussing crime-fraud and tort exceptions to attorney-
client privilege).
51. Restatement (Third), supra note 37, § 82; see Am. Tobacco Co. v. Florida, 697
So. 2d 1249 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding tobacco company documents not
privileged because of crime/fraud exception).
52. Restatement (Third), supra note 37, § 69, rep. note.
53. Id.
54. For a current description of state-by-state variations prepared by the
Attorneys' Liability Assurance Society, Inc., see Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D.
Rotunda, 2001 Selected Standards on Professional Responsibility (Appendix A,
following reprinting of Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct).
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rights. The other argument rests on social utility of client
confidentiality.
Proponents of a strong view of confidentiality have argued that
clients have constitutional rights to confidentiality based on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. In Fisher v. United States5 the Supreme
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination protected
information that a client had conveyed to a lawyer (1) if the attorney-
client privilege applied to the conveyance of the information from the
client to the lawyer and (2) if the information could not have been
obtained directly from the client because of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Under Fisher, a rule providing lawyers with discretion to reveal
confidential information to prevent or to rectify wrongful client
conduct would not violate the privilege against self-incrimination for
several reasons. First, the privilege against self-incrimination only
applies when a client is compelled to give incriminating testimony. 6
A rule providing lawyers with discretion does not involve any client
compulsion.
Second, the privilege only applies when the information would
incriminate the client. If a lawyer revealed information to prevent a
crime, there would be no incrimination because the crime would have
been averted, unless a client's conduct involved a conspiracy or
amounted to criminal attempt. In many cases the client's conduct
would not rise to the level of either conspiracy or attempt. If the
client has acted or is planning to act alone, the client has not engaged
in a conspiracy. If the client is merely planning some wrongful
conduct, perjury or assault for example, but has not committed an
overt act, the client probably would not be guilty of attempt.
Similarly, revelation of information to prevent or to rectify
noncriminal but tortious conduct would also not carry any criminal
implications. Disclosure to rectify past criminal conduct could
incriminate the client, but lawyers could use their discretion in this
situation to refuse to reveal this information unless the client were
given use immunity.'
Finally, to the extent the client is seeking to employ the lawyer's
services to commit a crime or fraud or to the extent the client actually
uses the lawyer's services in the commission of a crime or fraud, any
communications from the client to the lawyer are not subject to the
attorney-client privilege." Under Fisher, when the communication
from the client to the lawyer is not subject to the attorney-client
55. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
56. Id. at 397.
57. See Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences
to Prevent Harm, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 1091, 1120-27 (1985).
58. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
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privilege, the communication is not protected under the privilege
against self-incrimination.
Similarly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not prevent
lawyers from having discretion to reveal confidential information to
prevent or to rectify client harm. First, the Sixth Amendment only
applies to criminal cases, and not to civil matters. Even in criminal
cases the right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of
adversarial judicial proceedings.59 A rule that required disclosure of
information prior to that time would not violate the Sixth
Amendment. Even if the attorney were making disclosure after a
right to counsel attached, a Sixth Amendment violation only occurs if
counsel's conduct falls below the standard of "reasonably effective
assistance" and the client suffers prejudice. 6° If a lawyer disclosed
information to prevent or to rectify client harm pursuant to a rule of
professional conduct authorizing such disclosure, it would be difficult
to argue that the lawyer's conduct fell below the level of reasonably
effective assistance. Indeed, in Nix v. Whiteside6 the Supreme Court
held that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was not violated when his lawyer threatened to disclose to the court,
pursuant to Model Rule 3.3, the client's intention to commit perjury.
The Court held that defense counsel's actions fell "well within
accepted standards of professional conduct... acceptable under
Strickland."'
A broader statement of the clients' rights argument focuses on
moral rather than legal rights.6 3 Under this view, the client's moral
rights to privacy and autonomy justify an obligation of
confidentiality.' But moral philosophy recognizes that rights such as
privacy and autonomy may be limited in various situations, in
particular when a person intends to harm others.65 Thus, neither
constitutional nor moral rights justify a strict rule of confidentiality.
The social utility argument for confidentiality claims that if clients
are encouraged to reveal confidential information, including
information about wrongdoing, lawyers will be in a position to
dissuade them from wrongful conduct. Under this view a rule of
confidentiality is more likely to prevent or to rectify harm than a rule
authorizing disclosure.
59. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986).
60. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
61. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
62. Id. at 171.
63. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A
"Philosophically Informed" and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics,
36 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 177 (1985).
64. Id. at 188-91.
65. Id. at 194; cf 1 Joel Feinberg, The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law: Harm to
Others (1984) (arguing that behavior should not be criminalized unless it is harmful to
others).
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The social utility argument is based on assumptions that are both
unproven and of doubtful validity.' The argument assumes that
clients will be deterred from seeking legal advice or from providing
lawyers with complete information about past or prospective wrongful
conduct if lawyers have discretion to disclose information to prevent
or to rectify such conduct. Clients seeking to conform their conduct to
the law but uncertain about what the law requires are unlikely to be
deterred from seeking legal advice simply because lawyers have
discretion to reveal confidential information to prevent or to rectify
wrongful conduct. These clients will seek advice to comply with the
law. On the other hand, clients who are seeking to use the lawyer's
services instrumentally to achieve their ends, whether they violate the
law or not, may be deterred from seeking legal advice, but this
deterrence is probably socially desirable. Without the assistance of
counsel it may be more difficult for them to obtain their ends through
violation of the law.67 In addition, even the staunchest supporters of
confidentiality agree that lawyers should be allowed to reveal
confidential information to defend themselves against charges of
wrongdoing." Clients seeking legal advice must, therefore, assume
that if they reveal information about their wrongful conduct, a lawyer
might under some circumstances divulge this information. Expanding
the scope of the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality is unlikely to
have much effect, if any, on client incentives to consult with counsel.
Limited empirical studies of attorney-client confidentiality lend little
support to the need for strict confidentiality.69 Finally, some states,
most notably New Jersey7' and Florida,7 require lawyers to disclose
66. See Daniel R. Fischel, Lawyers and Confidentiality, 65 U. Chi. L Rev. 1 (1998)
(arguing that confidentiality rules benefit lawyers but are of dubious value to clients
and society as a whole); Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L
Rev. 351 (1989) (questioning the wisdom of strict confidentiality rules on both policy
and empirical grounds).
67. See Nathan M. Crystal, Confidentiality Under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 30 U. Kan. L. Rev. 215,225-26 (1982) (using a hypothetical analysis of types
of clients that lawyers represent to conclude that a disclosure rule is more likely to
reduce harm than a rule of confidentiality); Subin, supra note 57, at 1166-72 (finding
instrumental defense less persuasive than rights-based argument for confidentiality);
see also Steven Shavell, Legal Advice About Contemplated Acts: The Decision to
Obtain Advice, Its Social Desirability, and Protection of Confidentiality, 17 J. Legal
Stud. 123 (1988) (developing model dealing with effect of advice and confidentiality
on rational decision-making).
68. See Fox, Minority Report, supra note 34, at "Confidentiality."
69. See Zacharias, supra note 66, at 376.
70. NJ. Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(b) provides as follows:
(b) A lawyer shall reveal such information to the proper authorities, as soon
as, and to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary, to prevent the
client:
(1) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm
or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another-,
(2) from committing a criminal, illegal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
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confidential information to prevent harm in various situations.
Lawyers in these states are not crying out in anguish that these rules
of ethics have crippled their ability to function as professionals.7 2
Thus, as is the case with undivided loyalty, the ABA's conception of
confidentiality does not protect a core value of the profession.
Indeed, the ABA's action with regard to confidentiality is even less
defensible than its position on loyalty. The scope of the duty of
loyalty is at least unclear. With regard to confidentiality, the ABA's
position violates a core value of the profession included in its original
rules of ethics requiring lawyers to reveal fraud or deception that has
been practiced on a court or third party. Even worse, under the
lawyer protection exception 73  to confidentiality, the current
confidentiality rules allow a lawyer to reveal the information to
protect the lawyer's own interests but not when others are the victims
of fraud.
IV. DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES
The ABA Core Values Resolution lists as one obligation the
"lawyer's duty to promote access to justice. '74  Many studies have
documented a substantial need for legal services by both poor and
moderate-income Americans. Approximately eighty percent of the
legal problems of the poor and forty to sixty percent of the legal issues
facing middle-income individuals go unmet.75
Despite this well-recognized need, evidence indicates that the
problem is getting worse. Federal funding of the Legal Services
Corporation, the primary vehicle for delivery of civil legal services to
low-income individuals, has languished and the program has been
76Reetsmired in political controversy for years. Recent surveys indicate that
reasonably believes is likely to perpetrate a fraud upon a tribunal.
N.J. Rules of Profl Conduct R. 1.6(b) (1997).
71. Florida Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4-1.6(b) provides as follows:
(b) When Lawyer Must Reveal Information. A lawyer shall reveal such
information to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(1) to prevent a client from committing a crime; or
(2) to prevent a death or substantial bodily harm to another.
Fla. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 4-1.6(b) (1998).
72. But see Leslie C. Levin, Testing the Radical Experiment: A Study of Lawyer
Response to Clients Who Intend to Harm Others, 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 81 (1994)
(expressing doubt about the wisdom of New Jersey's mandatory disclosure rule based
on a survey of lawyers).
73. The exception found in Model Rule 1.6(b)(2) is sometimes referred to, even
by critics of confidentiality, as the self-defense exception, but this is a misnomer. See,
e.g., Fischel, supra note 66, at 10-11. The rule allows lawyers to disclose confidential
information in self-defense, but it also allows lawyers to disclose when asserting
affirmative claims.
74. ABA Core Values Resolution, supra note 9, § 1(f.
75. Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1785, 1785 & n.1
(2001).
76. Id. at 1793-97.
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the private bar does not provide significant pro bono services.' The
August 17, 2000, issue of the New York Times comments on the
dramatic decline in the number of pro bono hours donated by major
law firms.78 In 1992, the top ranking firm, Arnold & Porter, averaged
220.6 pro bono hours per lawyer.79 By contrast, in 1999, the top
ranking firm, Covington & Burling, averaged 105.5 pro bono hours
per lavyer80 Arnold & Porter, now number three on the list, declined
to 89.3 hours per lawyer.8' Why the decline? Esther Lardent, the
director of the pro bono institute at Georgetown, notes that the
number of billable hours for lawyers has increased from 1700 a few
years ago to an average of 2200 to 2300. -
A. Historically, Rules of Ethics Have Done Little to Promote
Delivery of Legal Services
In light of this historical background, does the profession have a
core value of a duty to promote access to justice? Historically, the
Bar has barely recognized the need for delivery of legal services. The
1908 Canons said very little about promotion of access to justice.
Canon 4 stated: "A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent
prisoner ought not to ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and
should always exert his best efforts in his behalf."' Canon 29
provided that a lawyer "should strive at all times to uphold the honor
and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only
the law but the administration of justice."' Similarly, the 1969 Model
Code of Professional Responsibility did not contain a disciplinary rule
on the duty to promote access to justice, relegating the concept to the
ethical considerations, which were purely aspirational.'5 The 1983
version of the Model Rules included an aspirational statement: "A
lawyer should render public interest legal service."' " In 1993 the ABA
House of Delegates voted to amend the rule to provide a standard of
77. Id. at 1809-10.
78. Greg Winter, Legal Firms Cutting Back On Free Services for Poor, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 17,2000, at Al.
79. Id.
80. Id
81. Id.
82- Id.
83. ABA, Opinions, supra note 27. at 19 (setting forth Canon 4).
84. Id. at 131 (setting forth Canon 29).
85. Ethical Consideration 2-25 stated that the "basic responsibility for providing
legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the individual lawyer ....
Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should
find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged." Model Code of Prof'l
Responsibility EC 2-25 (1981). EC 8-3 stated that "[tihose persons unable to pay for
legal services should be provided needed services." EC 8-3. EC 8-9 stated that "[tihe
advancement of our legal system is of vital importance in maintaining the rule of
law... [and] lawyers should encourage, and should aid in making, needed changes
and improvements." EC 8-9.
86. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 6.1 (1983).
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50 hours per year of pro bono service a substantial majority of which
should be directed to persons of limited means, but the standard
remained voluntary.' The Ethics 2000 Commission considered but
finally rejected the concept of mandatory pro bono. 8 Some states
have considered proposals for mandatory pro bono. The report of the
Marrero Committee in New York represents probably the most well
known, fully developed of these proposals.89 But no state has adopted
such a requirement. In fact, only a few states have adopted rules
requiring lawyers to disclose the number of pro bono hours they
render.' The Ethics 2000 Commission also refused to recommend a
disclosure requirement. 9'
B. The ABA Has Ignored Proposals by Its Own Commission to
Lessen Restrictions on the Unauthorized Practice of Law
Not only has the bar refused to impose a professional obligation to
assist in the delivery of legal services, the bar has actively resisted
efforts to provide those services from other sources. The most direct
way to improve delivery of legal services to moderate-income
individuals is by relaxing the restrictions on the unauthorized practice
of law. In 1994 the ABA-sponsored Commission on Nonlawyer
Practice issued a report describing the activities of "legal technicians"
(nonlawyers providing legal services without supervision by lawyers)
in the following areas: federal and state administrative agency
practice, immigration practice, federal and state taxation, specially
authorized practice in certain courts, housing disputes, family law, real
estate, independent claim adjusters, debt collection, debt counseling
and general practice.' In August 1995 the commission issued a
second report, "Nonlawyer Activities in Law-Related Situations," in
which it found that, with adequate protection for the public,
nonlawyers had an important role to play in delivery of legal services
to the public. The commission recommended that the ABA
reconsider its ethics rules and policies in a variety of areas, including
those governing the unauthorized practice of law. In particular, the
87. Model Rules of Prof'1 Conduct R. 6.1 (1993).
88. Margaret Colgate Love, ABA Ethics 2000 Commission Final Report-
Summary of Recommendations, § 34, at http://www.abanet.orglcpr/e2k-mlove-article.
html (June 9, 2001).
89. Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services: Final Report to the
Chief Judge of the State of New York (1990), reprinted in 19 Hofstra L. Rev. 755
(1991). For a summary of the report and a critical review of the literature in support
of and in opposition to mandatory pro bono, see Crystal, Professional Responsibility,
supra note 32, at 481-86.
90. See, e.g., Fla. Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 4-6.1(b) (1998) (Florida is the largest
state with such a requirement).
91. Love, supra note 88, § 34.
92. ABA Comm'n on Nonlawyer Practice, Nonlawyer Practice in the United
States: Summary of the Factual Record Before the Commission (1994).
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commission concluded that for many, legal services regulation of
nonlawyers rather than prohibition was in the public interest. The
commission also summarized various areas in which states might
consider regulation, including age, experience, education, training,
recordkeeping, continuing education and admission examinations.
The organized bar has responded to this ABA report by ignoring it.
In fact, the typical response of the bar to a recommendation to lessen
restrictions on the unauthorized practice of law is just the opposite: to
strengthen enforcement efforts. In this regard, it is interesting to note
the ABA's Core Values Resolution includes the following:
"Jurisdictions should retain and enforce laws that generally bar the
practice of law by entities other than law firms.""3 Deborah Rhode
has concluded that meaningful progress in removing restrictions on
the unauthorized practice of law is likely to require reduction of bar
control of the process. 4
V. EXCLUSIVE AUTHORITY OF COURTS TO REGULATE THE
PRACTICE OF LAW
The position of the organized bar against relaxation of restrictions
on the unauthorized practice of law is closely related to a more
general issue: Do courts have the exclusive authority to regulate the
practice of law? Professor Wolfram has labeled the claim of exclusive
judicial authority to regulate the practice of law as the negative
inherent powers doctrine.95 In 1989, the ABA House of Delegates
took a firm position on this issue much like the Core Values
Resolution in connection with the MDP debate. The ABA House of
Delegates adopted a resolution providing that the ABA "opposes the
regulation of the practice of law by executive or legislative bodies,
whether national, state or local.""6
The negative inherent powers doctrine dramatically limits the
power of state legislatures to make changes that they believe would
improve the delivery of legal services to moderate income individuals.
Moreover, the doctrine does not simply limit legislative attempts that
directly affect court proceedings; it also applies to administrative
proceedings and to transactional matters that do not involve
93. ABA Core Values Resolution, supra note 9. § 6.
94. See Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-lawyers, 4 Geo.
J. Legal Ethics 209, 232-33 (1990).
95. Charles W. Wolfram, Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulaion-The Role of the
Inherent-Powers Doctrine, 12 U. Ark. Little Rock LJ. 1. 7 (1989-1990), see also
Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 2.2 (1986) (hereinafter Wolfram,
Modem Legal Ethics]. The affirmative inherent powers doctrine provides that courts
have the inherent power to regulate certain matters, including the legal profession,
even in the absence of legislative authorization. Id. § 2.2.2. In its positive form, the
doctrine does not limit the power of other branches of the government. hi.
96. ABA Res., ABA House of Delegates. 114 ABA Reports. No. 1, at 35 (1989).
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appearance before tribunals. Two recent cases illustrate the impact of
the doctrine.
A. Recent Cases Show the Broad Scope of the Negative Inherent
Powers Doctrine
Turner v. Kentucky Bar Association' involved the constitutionality
of a Kentucky statute that was enacted as part of a comprehensive
reform of the state's workers' compensation system. One goal of the
reform was to make claims resolution more administrative and less
dependent on formal litigation. The legislation created a Division of
Ombudsman and Workers' Compensation Specialist Services." In
addition, the General Assembly passed another provision which
stated, "Notwithstanding any provisions of law to the contrary, the
provisions of this chapter shall not be construed or interpreted to
prohibit nonattorney representation of injured workers covered by
this chapter." 99 After the legislation was passed, the Kentucky Bar
Association adopted an ethics opinion advising that nonlawyers may
not represents clients before the Department and nonlawyers may not
serve as workers' compensation specialists because such activities
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.100
The Kentucky Supreme Court held that under the state's
constitutional provisions and prior decisions of the court, the Supreme
Court had exclusive authority over the practice of law.' 10 The court
did recognize, however, the possibility of a limited degree of
legislative action under the principle of comity:
"The correct principle, as we view it, is that the legislative function
cannot be so exercised as to interfere unreasonably with the
functioning of the courts, and that any unconstitutional intrusion is
per se unreasonable, unless it be determined by the court that it can
and should be tolerated in a spirit of comity."
Undoubtedly, the separation of powers principles strictly prohibit
the legislature from infringing upon the judiciary's exclusive power
to make rules governing the practice of law, court procedures, and
any exceptions thereto.1°2
Based on this principle, the court found that Section 342.320(9) of
the legislation, which authorized nonlawyers to appear before the
Department, was unconstitutional:
97. 980 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1998).
98. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 342.329 (1997).
99. Id. § 342.320(9).
100. Ky. Bar Ass'n, Formal Op. U-52 (1997).
101. Turner, 980 S.W.2d at 562-63.
102. Id. at 563 (quoting Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 688
(Ky. 1980)).
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In the case at bar, the legislature has authorized non-attorneys in the
Department to act as legal representatives in workers' compensation
cases. This is not within its purview. The legislature has no power
to make rules relating to the practice of law or create exceptions to
the settled rules of this Court. Thus KRS 342.320(9) is
unconstitutional. 103
The court also held that it would not recognize the legislation under
the principle of comity because it was not a "'statutorily acceptable'
substitute for current judicially mandated procedures.""
The Virginia case of Fears v. Virginia State Bar" involved the
constitutionality of legislation authorizing nonlawyers to perform a
variety of real estate closing and settlement services. The plaintiffs, a
Virginia attorney who specialized in real estate practice and an
association of real estate attorneys, sought a declaratory judgment
that the Virginia Consumer Real Estate Settlement Protection Act
("CRESPA") was unconstitutional."°b The act authorized "settlement
agents" to provide a variety of real estate closing and settlement
services. Settlement agents may be lawyers or nonlawyers so long as
they comply with the provisions of the act." 7 The act provided for
regulation of settlement agents and preempted court rules that would
otherwise prohibit their activities: "Notwithstanding any rule of court
to the contrary, a settlement agent operating in compliance with the
requirements of this chapter or a party to the real estate transaction
may provide escrow, closing or settlement services and receive
compensation for such services."'" Settlement agents were required
to be licensed and meet certain requirements for financial
responsibility, including malpractice insurance and fidelity and surety
bonds."0 9 The act directed the Virginia State Bar, in consultation with
the Virginia State Corporation Commission and the Virginia Real
Estate Board, to promulgate regulations establishing guidelines for
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Foster v. Overstreet, 905 S.W.2d 504, 507 (Ky. 1995)). The court
upheld, however, the constitutionality of the statute authorizing the Department to
employ workers' compensation specialists. Reviewing the actual practices of the
specialists, the court found that they did not involve the practice of law. None of
these tasks involved the interpretation or analysis of law. Most of the tasks
performed by specialists were procedural and administrative in nature and were
similar to services that the court had previously authorized paralegals to perform. Ky.
Sup. Ct. R. 3.700. In addition, although the chief specialist was not required by
statute to be an attorney, in practice, the chief specialist had always been an attorney.
Thus, in operation, the specialists were supervised by a lawyer. Turner, 980 S.W.2d at
564.
105. 2000 WL 249247 (Va. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2000).
106. Va. Code Ann. §§ 6.1-2.19 to 6.1-2.29 (1950).
107. Fears, 2000 WL 249247, at *1.
108. Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.21(B).
109. Id. § 6.1-2.21(D).
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settlement agents to avoid the unauthorized practice of law in
conjunction with providing escrow, closing and settlement services."10
The court rejected the plaintiff's constitutional claims based on the
special legislation clause of the Virginia constitution and claims based
on the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States
Constitution."' It then turned to the separation of powers challenge.
The Attorney General argued that CRESPA did not amount to an
attempt to regulate the practice of law because CRESPA expressly
defined escrow and settlement services as "administrative and
clerical" rather than the practice of law. The court found this
argument "untenable" because the Virginia Supreme Court, not the
legislature, had the inherent power to determine what constituted the
practice of law."' The court then proceeded to examine the activities
that settlement agents were allowed to perform under the act" 3 to
determine if they constituted the practice of law." 4
After examining each of the activities authorized for settlement
agents, the court found that some of the activities clearly did not
amount to the practice of law"5 while some were too vaguely defined
to make a facial determination as to whether they amounted to the
110. Id. § 6.1-2.26(B).
111. Fears, 2000 WL 249247, at *2-4.
112. Id. at *4.
113. See Va. Code Ann. § 6.1-2.20.
114. Under rules adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court, the practice of law
occurs if:
(1) One undertakes for compensation, direct or indirect, to advise another,
not his regular employer, in any matter involving the application of legal
principles to facts or purposes or desires.
(2) One, other than as a regular employee acting for his employer,
undertakes, with or without compensation, to prepare for another legal
instruments of any character, other than notices or contracts incident to the
regular course of conducting a licensed business.
(3) One undertakes, with or without compensation, to represent the interest
of another before any tribunal.
Fears, 2000 WL 249247, at *7 (citations omitted).
115. The court found:
Preliminarily, activities in Code § 6.1-2.20 that clearly are not the practice of
law are placing orders for title insurance, receiving and issuing receipts for
money received from the parties, ordering loan checks and payoffs, ordering
surveys and inspections, setting the closing appointment, receiving and
disbursing funds, sending recording documents to the lender, and sending
the recorded documents and the title policy to the buyer. These activities do
not require the application of law to fact, do not necessarily involve the
giving of legal advice, and, at most, require the creation of documents
which.., are simple and incidental to the regular business of real estate
brokers.
Id. at *7. The court found that the preparation of settlement statements did not
amount to the practice of law. Id. at *8. In addition, handling or arranging for the
recording of documents and reporting federal tax information for the real estate sale
to the IRS did not necessarily involve the practice of law. Id. at *10.
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practice of law."6 However, the court concluded that two of the
activities listed in the statute did involve the practice of law: "In
summary, a person or entity licensed and acting under CRESPA
necessarily practices law whenever he or she determines that all
closing documents conform to the parties' contract requirements or
ascertains for the purposes of closing that the lenders' instructions
have been satisfied."' 1 7
Having determined that the statute did in part attempt to regulate
the practice of law, the court turned to the question of whether the
statute was unconstitutional. The court noted that the purpose of the
separation of powers doctrine was to prevent the exercise of the whole
power of one department by another. The doctrine did not prevent
some overlapping regulation."' Under the police power, the
legislature had the power to regulate professions so long as its
regulation was confined to the public's health, safety, morals or
welfare, while the courts had the power to regulate the legal
profession to maintain integrity and confidence in the judicial
system.1 9 Nonetheless, for the judiciary's power to have meaning it
must necessarily displace the power of the legislature within its sphere
of action. Despite this analysis the court still denied plaintiffs relief.
The Virginia Supreme Court had previously adopted the state bar's
unauthorized practice opinion number 183. That opinion excluded
from the unauthorized practice of law the activities of settlement
agents who were duly qualified and registered under CRESPA. Thus,
in an odd twist to an opinion that seemed to have reached the point of
declaring CRESPA unconstitutional, the court found that the
legislation could not be upheld on its own, but that it had legal effect
by virtue of the Virginia Supreme Court's adoption of the legislation
through the bar's ethics opinion.2 Under this analysis the Virginia
Supreme Court would, of course, be free to withdraw the authority of
nonlawyers to act under CRESPA.
B. Historically, A Number of Courts, Including the Supreme Courts
of California and New York, Have Rejected a Broad Negative Inherent
Powers Doctrine
Is exclusive judicial authority over the practice of law a core value
of the profession? Historically, many state courts, perhaps a majority,
have claimed the exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law.'2'
But assertion of such a power is far from uniform. In a number of
important states, including California and New York, extensive
116. Id at *8-9.
117. Id. at *10.
118. Id- at *11.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *11-12.
121. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics, supra note 95. § 2.2.2.
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legislative regulation of the practice of law exists.2 2 Courts in these
states have been willing to uphold such legislation even when it goes
so far as to affect directly the court's power to discipline lawyers. For
example, in In re Paguirigan' the California Supreme Court stated:
"We long have recognized the Legislature's authority to adopt
measures regarding the practice of law.... This pragmatic approach
is grounded in this court's recognition that the separation of powers
principle does not command a []hermetic sealing off of the three
branches of Government from one another."' 24
Similarly, in Forti v. New York State Ethics Commission," the New
York Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff Forti's separation of powers claim rests on the erroneous
assumption that only the judiciary may regulate the practice of law,
so that any legislative attempt to impose restrictions on attorneys'
practices would be a usurpation of judicial power. In fact, the
Legislature can-and does-regulate many aspects of the practice of
law in this State (see, Judiciary Law art. 15). Indeed, the very power
of this court to prescribe rules for the admission of attorneys is
122. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 6000-6228. (1990); N.Y. Jud. Law, §§ 460-496.(1983).
123. 17 P.3d 758 (Cal. 2001).
124. Id. at 762 (citations omitted); accord Obrien v. Jones, 999 P.2d 95 (Cal. 2000)
(upholding against a separation of powers challenge the constitutionality of legislation
authorizing executive and legislative branches to appoint three of five hearing judges
to State Bar Court and eliminating lay judge position from Review Department of
State Bar Court).
In Paguirigan the court noted that only on "rare occasions" would a legislative
enactment significantly impair the court's inherent authority over the practice of law.
Paguirigan, 17 P.3d at 763. One of the rare occasions mentioned was Iustedt v.
Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, 636 P.2d 1139 (Cal. 1981), where the court
held that a statute granting the state workers' compensation board the power to
temporarily or permanently prohibit an attorney from practicing before the board was
an unconstitutional infringement of the court's inherent authority to regulate the
practice of law. The court first recognized that the legislature had a legitimate
interest in regulating the legal profession because the legal profession and the practice
of law were matters of public interest. Id. at 1143 & n.7. Under the police power the
legislature could adopt reasonable regulations of the practice of law so long as
legislative action did not "defeat or materially impair the exercise of [the
constitutional] functions" of the courts. Id. at 1144 (citation omitted). Having
adopted this cooperative standard, however, the court found that the statute in
question was unconstitutional because it did materially impair the court's powers.
The court reasoned that the statute gave original jurisdiction over discipline to the
board and limited judicial review of the board's actions. Id. The court ruled that the
board could either refer the matter to the normal attorney disciplinary process or
institute contempt proceedings against the lawyer. Id. at 114849. Justice Newman
dissented on the separation of powers issue. He pointed out that the legislature had
authorized nonlawyers to appear before the board and the board had the power to
discipline these lay representatives. He reasoned that attorneys who opt to appear
before the board should be subject to the same rules and regulations as nonlawyers
who represent clients before the board. Id. at 1152 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
125. 554 N.E.2d 876 (N.Y. 1990).
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derived from the Legislature (see, Judiciary Law § 53; see also, § 90
[authorizing the Appellate Divisions to administer character and
fitness, as well as disciplinary, procedures]). 26
The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers does not take a
position on the issue, but the Reporter's Note to Section 1 criticizes
broad claims of exclusive judicial authority to regulate the practice of
law:
Claims of such sweeping judicial power over lawyers, exclusive of
the other branches of government, are unpersuasive. They first
appear in American jurisprudence only late in the 19th century. The
concept has sometimes been asserted in situations in which there
was no discernibly vital interest of the judicial branch in the claim of
regulatory power over lawyers. Those extreme assertions are
probably rooted in inter-branch politics in a jurisdiction and in its
particular traditions of state constitutional law. They are
undoubtedly often a reflection of the view of the court that the
particular legislative intervention is an excessive or simplistic
response to a complex problem. In some few states, a claim of
exclusive competence to regulate lawyers is more firmly based on
state constitutional provisions explicitly conferring on the judiciary
the power to regulate lavyers. 127
C. Policy Justifications for the Negative Inherent Powers Doctrine
Are Weak
Not only is the historical claim of exclusive judicial authority to
regulate the practice of law doubtful, but, as a matter of policy, the
claim is weak. Some legislative attempts to regulate the practice of
law or to deal with internal court affairs might be so extreme that
courts would be compelled to act in order to maintain their basic
functions. For example, if a legislature were to attempt to specify
methods of judicial deliberation by making judicial conferences
subject to open meetings laws, a court could properly declare such
legislation unconstitutional.'2 But barring such extreme cases, it is
difficult to see how legislative action undermines basic judicial
functions.
Take, for example, the Virginia legislation discussed above which
authorizes nonlawyers to handle real estate transactions. In what way
does such legislation undermine any basic function of the judiciary?
To say that such legislation attempts to regulate the practice of law
begs the question. A proponent of exclusive judicial power might
126. Id. at 884-85.
127. Restatement (Third), supra note 37, § 1, rep. note.
128. "[A] claim of exclusive judicial power to regulate lawyers is well-founded as a
general proposition of American constitutional law when intrusion by the executive
or legislative branch into the court's power to regulate would significantly prejudice
the judicial branch in its essential activity of adjudicating disputes." Id.
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argue that such legislation could lead to public confusion between
lawyers and nonlawyers, but well-drafted legislation could avoid this
problem by prohibiting nonlawyers who perform real estate functions
from holding themselves out as lawyers and by requiring their
advertisements to disclaim that they are lawyers or admitted to
practice law. If the legislation did not contain such restrictions, a
court could employ the positive inherent powers doctrine to impose
the requirements without invalidating the legislation. 9
A proponent of the negative inherent powers doctrine could argue
that consumers will not understand such disclaimers and will be
unable to appreciate the value of having a lawyer. Such claims do not,
however, have any empirical support. Further, there is no reason to
believe that courts are in any better position than legislatures to make
the determination of whether the need for consumer protection
requires prohibition of certain activities rather than disclosure
coupled with some form of regulation. Indeed, good reasons exist to
believe that courts are not in as good a position as legislatures to make
such evaluations. Judges are, after all, drawn from the practice of law
and will more likely be willing to protect the interests of lawyers than
legislative bodies, which are more representative of the public.
The Reporter's Note to the Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers also expresses a skeptical view of the policy arguments in
favor of a broad negative inherent powers doctrine:
It should not be considered such an intrusion for an administrative
agency to regulate the conduct of lawyers in matters pending before
the agency or for the legislative branch to regulate the activities of
lawyers who appear before or are members of it. Moreover, general
regulation of lawyers by the legislative or executive branch that does
not substantially differ from similar regulation applicable to
members of other professions should not be considered to violate
separation-of-powers principles. The legislature speaks for the
whole electorate and can coordinate state policies concerning
lawyers with other policies, although it cannot provide the
continuing, detailed, and informed involvement that courts can, and
it may be swayed by transient complaints. 30
The policy argument against exclusive judicial authority over the
practice of law finds support in the practice of the federal courts. The
federal courts have never claimed, as against Congress, the broad
negative inherent powers doctrine claimed by some state courts. In
1866 in Ex parte Garland,'31 the Supreme Court stated that "[tihe
legislature may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications for the office [of
129. See supra note 95 (discussing the positive inherent powers doctrine).
130. Restatement (Third), supra note 37, § 1, rep. note.
131. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); see also Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, supra
note 95, § 2.2.5 n.82.
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lawyer]. '132  Congress has enacted many statutes that regulate the
activities of lawyers. For example, as a result of complaints about
solicitation by lawyers following air craft disasters, Congress enacted
legislation prohibiting solicitation by lawyers within 45 days after a
disaster.133 Rules of procedure in the federal courts are subject to
Congressional disapproval under the Rules Enabling Act. Many
federal administrative agencies including the Social Security
Administration 135 and the Internal Revenue Service"' provide that
nonlawyers may appear before agencies. None of these intrusions
into regulation of the practice of law seem to have undermined the
power of the federal judiciary to any significant degree.
In summary, like the claimed core values of undivided loyalty to the
client, strict confidentiality, and promotion of access to justice, the
contention that the judiciary has the exclusive authority to regulate
the practice of law cannot withstand either historical or policy
analysis.
CONCLUSION
This article has focused on four claimed "core values" of the legal
profession: undivided loyalty, strict confidentiality, promotion of
access to justice, and exclusive judicial authority to regulate the
practice of law. It has suggested that in deciding whether a value
qualifies as a core value of the profession two issues are significant.
First, what is the historical basis of the value? Second, how central is
the value to the functioning of the legal profession? In each of the
four instances considered in this article, the claimed value does not
withstand analysis.
The concept of the core values of the professional has been more a
rhetorical tool than a useful basis for analysis of proposed changes in
132. Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 379-80.
133. The statute provides as follows:
Unsolicited communications.- In the event of an accident involving an air
carrier providing interstate or foreign air transportation and in the event of
an accident involving a foreign air carrier that occurs within the United
States, no unsolicited communication concerning a potential action for
personal injury or wrongful death may be made by an attorney (including
any associate, agent, employee, or other representative of an attorney) or
any potential party to the litigation to an individual injured in the accident,
or to a relative of an individual involved in the accident, before the 45th day
following the date of the accident.
49 U.S.C. § 1136(g)(2) (1997). The statute is similar to the Florida Rule of
Professional ethics, the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court upheld in
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
134. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1984). Section 2074 requires submission of
procedural rules approved by the Supreme Court to Congress. Such rules become
effective unless disapproved by Congress. Id. § 2074.
135. 20 C.F.R. § 404.949 (2001).
136. 31 C.F.R. § 10.3 (2001).
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rules of professional conduct. At a deeper level the appeal to core
values has been used in an effort to maintain professional
independence from other regulatory forces and to help sustain a
professional monopoly over the delivery of legal services. 37  The
profession is not well served by this rhetoric. It supports the claims of
critics of the profession who assert that the profession cannot be
trusted to regulate itself in the public interest. Moreover, it places the
profession in the position of arguing that market forces are irrelevant
to the debate over ethics. They are not. Lawyers function in a
competitive market place. Although the ABA took a strong stance
against MDPs, market forces are undermining the ABA's action and
reducing its position to one of irrelevance. 3 ' Similarly, in many
jurisdictions, market changes, particularly the development of title
insurance, have marginalized lawyers in real estate transactions. 139
The profession would be much better served by fostering realistic
debates that take into account a full range of values, including market
values, rather than by using the rhetoric of core values as a kind of
veto over change in rules of professional conduct.
137. For the classic study of the anticompetitive consequences of professional
standards, see Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (1962); see also Benjamin
H. Barton, Why Do We Regulate Lawyers?: An Economic Analysis of the
Justifications for Entry and Conduct Regulation, 33 Ariz. St. L.J. 429 (2001) (criticizing
present structure of professional regulation and proposing an alternative system
narrowly tailored to defensible rationales).
138. John Gibeaut, Cash Boughs: Since the ABA's Rejection of Multidisciplinary
Practices, More Law Firms are Branching Out into Law-Related Businesses, A.B.A.
J., Feb. 2001, at 50; see also John S. Dzienkowski & Robert J. Peroni,
Multidisciplinary Practice and the American Legal Profession: A Market Approach to
Regulating the Delivery of Legal Services in the Twenty-First Century, 69 Fordham L.
Rev. 83 (2000). The Appellate Divisions of the New York Supreme Court recently
adopted rules allowing lawyers to participate in business affiliations with other
professionals who provide nonlegal services. New York Modifies Rules to Authorize
Multidisciplinary Business Affiliations, 17 Law. Manual on Prof'l Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 16, at 464 (Aug. 1, 2001). A task force of the California Bar has
recommended that lawyers be allowed to participate in fully integrated MDPs.
California Bar Task Force Floats Plan for Amending Ethics Rules to Allow MDPs, 17
Law. Manual on Prof'l Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 15, at 431 (July 18, 2001).
139. Michael Braunstein, Structural Change and Inter-Professional Competitive
Advantage: An Example Drawn from Residential Real Estate Conveyancing, 62 Mo. L.
Rev. 241 (1997).
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